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A RESPONSE TO COMMENTS ON "JUDICIAL ACTIVISM" 
LIBERTY'S SAFETY NET 
Suzanna Sherry 
I AM HONORED AND HUMBLED by the breadth and depth of the responses to my essay on judicial activism, including Richa. rd Epstein's very generous introduction. Each of the contributors has packed a tremendous amount of insight and information 
into an impossibly limited number of words, and the comments will 
be extremely useful as I go forward with the project of turning the 
original essay into a book. 
My essay might be characterized as a rhetorical call to arms, an 
undifferentiated embrace of judicial activism. Three of the commen­
tators provide very helpful substantive support for the call to arms, 
and two others off er refinements that call into question the lack of 
differentiation. I consider all five to be friendly amendments to my 
motion for increased judicial activism, and will therefore consider 
them relatively briefly. 
Both Scott Gerber and Diane Mazur write with expertise that I 
lack, each in a way that deepens and enriches my arguments. I plan 
to read both their books1 and incorporate their arguments into my 
own, and I am grateful for their help. 
Herman 0. Loewenstein Prefessor ef Law, Vanderbilt University. Copyright © 2013 
Suzanna Sherry. 
1 SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: THE ORIGINS OF AN 
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY (2011); DIANE H. MAZUR, A MORE PERFECT MILITARY: 
How THE CONSTITUTION CAN MAKE OUR MILITARY STRONGER (2010). 
16 GREEN BAG 2D 467 
Micro-Symposium: Sherry's "Judicial Activism" 
Gerber makes the point that twenty-two centuries of political 
theory support judicial activism - and what a feat, to condense 
twenty-two centuries into five hundred words! I wholeheartedly 
agree with him that "without political theory America's constitu­
tional framers could not have used the lessons of history" to create 
an independent, liberty-preserving judiciary. He mistakes my point, 
however, if he understands me to argue that political theory weak­
ens my case. My quarrel is not with political theory but with all­
encompassing constitutional theories that aim to answer every con­
stitutional question through simple algorithms, and with (some) 
political scientists, who reduce the discipline of constitutional law to 
the study of raw politics. As I have argued elsewhere, all-encom­
passing constitutional theories are both impractical and ineffective; 
they neither produce certainty nor constrain judges. 2 I also take is­
sue with the "attitudinalist" political scientists who attribute every 
judicial vote to the judge's political preferences, viewing judges as 
legislators in black robes and thereby impoverishing our constitu­
tional discourse. 3 These political scientists, now joined by many 
constitutional scholars,4 flatten and coarsen the insights of the legal 
realists into two binary oppositions - one between law and politics 
and another between liberals and conservatives. This worldview 
produces a crude practical skepticism that makes deference to the 
popular branches seem the only reasonable alternative to Hand's 
bevy of Platonic Guardians. 5 Gerber and I both seek to provide a 
2 See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: 
THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002). 
3 See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). 
4 See, e.g. ,  Barry Friedman, The Importance ef Being Positive: The Nature and Function 
efjudicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257 (2004); Robert Post, Foreword: Fashion­
ing the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003); 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths ef the Rehnquist Court's Federalism 
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002). 
5 LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958). For elaboration of the argument 
in the text, see Suzanna Sherry, Democracy's Distrust: Contested Values and the Decline 
if Expertise, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 7 (2011), at www.harvardlawreview.org/issues 
/125/novemberl 1/forum_738.php. 
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richer and more nuanced description of constitutional adjudication, 
in which judicial activism moderates the worst aspects of politics 
rather than replicating them. 
Mazur focuses on how judicial deference leads to unaccountabil­
ity and encourages "professional rot . . .  arrogance, and hubris" in 
the institutions that are unaccountable. Her example is brilliant, 
moving, and persuasive: She argues that the Court's extreme defer­
ence to the military over the past thirty years is at the root of the 
current crisis of sexual assaults in the military. All I can add to her 
1malysis is to note the obvious: The military is not the only example 
although it is surely one of the strongest - of unaccountability 
leading to excess and poor decision-making. From over-indulged 
children to an under-constrained Congress, thosic who know their 
.1ctions will not be subject to effective oversight are prone to bad 
behavior. The founding generation knew this, and divided power 
i\ccordingly; of particular relevance here, they tried to create both a 
judiciary independent of the elected branches and a military de­
pendent on civilian leaders. As Mazur shows, we ignore their in-
11ights at our peril. 
-
I read Howard Wasserman's essay as providing additional sup­
port for my thesis, albeit more obliquely. I a� delighted to be cred­
ited with "normalizing" judicial activism and reversing the negative 
connotations of the activist label. He is probably too optimistic 
when he claims that my essay will "rob[] name-callers of a previously 
potent weapon," but, as the saying goes, from his mouth to God's 
ear. And of course he is absolutely right that one reason to claim 
activism as a positive is to move us beyond epithets to a more sub­
stantive discussion of the correctness of particular constitutional de­
cisions. All but the last paragraph of his comment, then, suggest that 
he is supportive of my call for more judicial activism. But he closes 
by saying that they (activists) can proudly declare "We're judicial ac­
tivists. Get used to it." Shouldn't that be we, Professor Wasserman? 
Turning now to the two friendly amendments: Both Scott Dod­
tiOn and Evan Zoldan take me to task for failing to differentiate 
among different types of activism. Both think that while increased 
i\Ctivism is a good idea in principle, it should be focused on limited 
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contexts. Dodson identifies a kind of judicial activism that might be 
uniformly - or at least mostly - bad, because it reduces liberty by 
increasing governmental power over individuals. He uses as an ex­
ample the jurisprudence governing state sovereign immunity, which 
makes it exceedingly difficult for Congress to lift that immunity and 
thus makes it easier for states to do harm without fear of being sued. 
Zoldan points out that as a historical matter, judicial review was 
designed to remedy the "tendency of democratic majorities to act 
out of passion and prejudice rather than after deliberation." He 
therefore suggests that judicial activism should be targeted at legisla­
tion that is rooted in passion or prejudice. 
Both Dodson and Zoldan are right in their basic insight: Not all 
judicial activism is created equal. Dodson's concern about liberty­
reducing activism is important, and it is certainly not limited to sov­
ereign irr1.munity doctrines. This past Term's decision in Shelby 
County v. Holder6 - which invalidated the preclearance formula of the 
federal Voting Rights Act and thus as a practical matter eliminated 
the preclearance requirement altogether, freeing states to make 
electoral changes subject only to post-enactment lawsuits - may be 
another example of the problem (more on Shelby County later). 
But that kind of activism is not only, as Dodson notes, less fre­
quent, it is also qualitatively different. Both the sovereign immunity 
doctrines and Shelby County raise questions of federalism: questions 
not about whether government can act in a particular way, but about 
which government can act. Activism in the whether context always 
enhances someone's liberty because it always constrains government 
action, although there may often be conflicts that require the court 
to decide whose liberty will be increased and whose will be dimin­
ished. In the which context, by contrast, the Court confronts a choice 
between constraining state governments and constraining the federal 
government; it is not always easy to tell what counts as activism or 
whether that activism will be liberty-enhancing or liberty-reducing. 
(The same can be said about separation-of-powers questions.) Activ­
ism in the name of federalism, then, can and should be distinguished. 
6 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
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Parsing activism in the way that Dodson suggests is also con­
sistent with the Court's role as a counter-majoritarian institution 
protecting against majority tyranny. The states do not need the 
courts' protection. As Herbert Wechsler pointed out almost sixty 
years ago, the states are protected by the political safeguards of fed­
eralism.7 And as Jesse Choper noted more than thirty years ago, 
Wechsler' s insight suggests that there is little or no justification for 
the courts to police federalism boundaries, and thus that the Court 
should not review federalism-based challenges to congressional ac­
tion at all, much less do so aggressively. 8 I take Dodson as reiterat­
ing both Wechsler's and Choper's points, and I have no quarrel with 
the idea in principle although I think it might be difficult to imple­
ment in practice because federalism principles and individual rights 
sometimes intersect.9 
That last problem - of correctly identifying the particular con­
text in order to determine the appropriateness of judicial activism -
also besets Zoldan' s suggestion. His historical point is exactly right, 
and well-illustrated by his quotations from various founding lumi­
naries. Perhaps Madison put it best, defending the concept of an 
unelected body to "protect the people against the transient impres­
sions into which they themselves might be led" as a result of "fickle­
ness and passinn" or "sudden impulses . . . to commit injustice on 
the minnrity."10 But how are we to identify which legislation impli­
cates this concern with passion or prejudice? John Hart Ely tried, 
but his elegant and eloquent theory has run into multiple obstacles 
in the three decades since he proposed it. 11 If as brilliant a scholar as 
7 Herbert Wcchslcl', rhc Political Sefeguards ef Federalism, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 
(1954). 
8 JESSE H. C!IOPf.R, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A 
FUNCTIONAL RL'CONS!DERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980). 
9 Consider U.S. v. Windsor, l 33 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), which invalidated the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion discussed both fed­
eralism and individual rights. 
10 JAMES MAlllSON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
194· 195 (Tuesday June 2b) (Adrienne Koch ed. 1966). 
11 JOHN HART ELY, IJhMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
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Ely could not successfully distinguish between legislation engen­
dered by passion or prejudice and legislation that results from rea­
soned deliberation, I am confident that no one can. One might also 
argue that the behavior of Congress over the past decade or so sug­
gests that Congress is incapable of reasoned deliberation and thus 
that no federal legislation should be exempt from judicial activism. 
In short, then, while I have no theoretical objection to the idea 
that there are many types of judicial activism, some more defensible 
than others, I do have practical objections. It is all well and good to 
propose that activism be confined so that it is either libertarian (as 
Dodson would have it) or targeted at legislation enacted in passion 
(as Zoldan urges). But we are no more likely to be able to identify 
and agree on which instances of judicial activism meet those con­
straints than we are to agree on which Supreme Court invalidations 
are good, wise, or constitutionally sound. We have to take the bit­
ter with the sweet when it comes to choosing between deference 
and activism. 
Aaron-Andrew Bruhl and Frank Colucci have more serious ob­
jections to my call for greater judicial activism. Each makes a some­
what different argument, but their bottom lines are similar: They 
would make the trade-off between too much activism and too much 
deference differently than I do. Colucci makes the point most ex­
plicitly, warning that an increase in activism will "encourage more 
false positives - and more Justices like Anthony Kennedy." Both 
Colucci and Bruhl tell us just what that trade-off looks like. Colucci 
says "Lawrence comes at the cost of Citizens United (or vice versa)"12 
(1980). For critiques identifying the obstacles, see, e.g. , Michael J. Klarman, The 
Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 784-88 (1991); 
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985); 
Paul Brest, The Substance ef Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981); Laurence H. 
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence ef Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 
1063 (1980); Mark Tushnet, Darkness at the Edge ef Town: The Contributions ef John 
Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980). For further evidence 
that Zoldan 's restatement of Ely's idea is equally problematic, one need only con­
sider the debates about whether affirmative action helps or hurts minorities and 
whether it should be subjected to strict scrutiny. 
12 The references are to Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) and Citizens 
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and points out that the activist Justice Kennedy was the only Justice 
who was in the majority in both Windsor and Shelby County. Bruhl 
warns of the risk of "judicial hyperactivity," which he illustrates by a 
laundry list of cases (including Windsor, Shelby County, and Citizens 
United), some deplored by conservatives and lauded by liberals and 
some exactly the reverse. 
But that is precisely my point. We can't have Lawrence and Wind­
sor without Shelby County and Citizens United. Fifty years from now 
we would be more ashamed of the Court having upheld sodomy 
statutes and DOMA than we will be of the Court having invalidated 
the predearance formula of the VRA and campaign finance legisla­
tion. At least that's my prediction, based on a modern evaluation of 
the Court's past performance (I will consider later Bruhl's objection 
to using the past to predict the future). And I think my view would 
probably coincide with the judgment of most Americans on both 
sides of the political aisle, if they could be convinced that they can't 
have it both ways. Given a choice between upholding both DOMA 
and§ 4 of the VRA (or campaign finance laws) or invalidating both, 
my guess is that a large majority of both liberals and conservatives 
would prefer to have the Court invalidate both. People cling to the 
belief that they can keep the cases they like and jettison the ones 
they don't only because our current political climate, our embrace 
of attitudinalist conceptions of as politically motivated, and 
our obsession with the illegitimacy judicial activism allow pundits 
and politicians to simultaneously as illegiti-
mate activism and celebrate Windsor (<1r vit:e we clear 
away the brush by showing that the <:ases ire twa 11ame 
coin, both might be viewed as more 
Both Colucci and Bruhl also raise other ""'"�''1""''"' 
gument that history suggests that we are 
activism than with too little. Colucci Is skc�ptk:al 
erty - freedom from majority tyranny 
constitutional regime. In response, I refer him 
lesson on the political theory of the founding 
United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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ard Wasserman's comment that the Court has viewed its role that 
way for at least the last half-century. 
Bruhl has a different objection: He suggests that the past may not 
be a good predictor of the future, given both "institutional circum­
stances" and the current Court's apparent willingness to invalidate 
federal statutes. I confess that I cannot prove that in the future we 
will regret today's deferential cases more than we regret the activist 
ones. But two fairly recent instances of deference have already been 
overruled or discredited and are, I think, on their way to universal 
co�demnation. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 13 the Court upheld laws ban­
ning homosexual sodomy. A mere seventeen years later, the Court 
overruled Bowers in Lawrence, calling it "not correct when it was de­
cided."14 And as Diane Mazur points out, the extreme deference of 
Rostker v. Goldberg15 produced a military in which sexual assault is 
common. and acceptable. Not only is the nation dealing with that 
crisis, it has also changed its mind about women in combat; and, as 
Mazur argues more broadly, Rostker is an illustration of the more 
general point that deference corrupts decision-making institutions 
and makes them more likely to err. If Bruhl is right that "[f]or dec­
ades now the Supreme Court has been plenty comfortable with its 
power of judicial review," it is all the more telling that it is still def­
erential cases that are the most problematic. 
As for institutional circumstances, I view party polarization and 
the "sclerotic, some say broken" Congress as reasons for placing 
more trust - not less - in an independent judiciary. And Bruhl's 
brief description of our political woes leads me to a broader point. 
Polarization and a broken Congress are symptoms of a deeper pa­
thology: At least in the United States, democracy is broken. The 
founding generation anticipated that possibility, which is why they 
hoped judges would provide a backstop against tyranny. Judicial 
activism is liberty's safety net; we should not cabin it just when we 
need it most. 
13478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
14 539 U.S. at 578. 
15 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
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Finally, a few words in praise of Richard Epstein (albeit not nec­
essarily in agreement with him). Praise from him is high praise in­
deed, and means the world to me. And I return his affection (and 
admiration) a hundredfold. Reading his introduction brought tears 
to my eyes. 
But I will not be adding either Keio or a theory of property rights 
to my work on judicial activism. Perhaps it is just my independent 
streak again, but I have to take issue with Richard's points. Keio v. 
City ef New London does not make the list of universally condemned 
cases for the same reason that Lochner v. New York16 does not: much 
as some scholars detest it, others agree with it.17 As for his broader 
point, if anyone can successfully craft a comprehensive political the­
ory of limited government that is both internally consistent and not 
vulnerable to obvious criticisms, it is Richard. But I have the same 
doubts about a comprehensive theory of limited government that I 
do about other comprehensive constitutional theories. In addition, 
my intuition is that any comprehensive theory that incorporates 
broad notions of a right of private property is likely to run into a 
major obstacle. The right to own property - especially as broadly 
conceived as Richard would have it - is different in several im­
portant ways from the rights at issue in the cases on my list. People 
usually do not place the same value on property as they do on liber­
ty. Incursions on property usually do not provoke the same revul­
sion as incursions on people's bodies, ideas, or actions. And, as the 
continuing debate over cases like Keio and Lochner shows, it seems 
unlikely that we will ever reach consensus about where the line 
should be drawn between property rights and the police power of 
the government. Richard's properly limited government is someone 
else's ineffective government; the same cannot be said about a gov­
ernment that refrains from, for example, imprisoning people based 
on their ancestry or sterilizing them based on pseudo-science. To 
the extent that my argument depends on a historical consensus 
It• 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
See, e.g. ,  Robert C. Ellickson, Federalism and Keio: A Qgestionfor Richard Epstein, 
t�4TULSAL.REV. 751, 761-64 (2009). 
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about what kinds of government actions are most likely to be even­
tually perceived as erroneous, it is difficult to reconcile with a broad 
view of property rights. And so we are back where I began: If we 
cannot agree on what the Constitution means or should mean, how 
might we determine whether judicial activism is good or bad? 
In the end, then, on the ultimate question of whether judicial ac­
tivism is likely to do more good than harm, history and theory can 
take 'us only so far. Those who view judges as power-hungry, politi­
cally driven, or irrational will never be persuaded that they are our 
salvation. But I believe that federal judges as a group are among the 
most ethical, professional, and disinterested decision-makers we 
have. The circumstances under which they make decisions - includ­
ing adversarial presentation of arguments, the transparency and rea­
soned elaboration of written opinions, and the incrementalism that 
is the concomitant of a precedent-based legal regime - further in­
crease the likelihood of sound judicial decisions.18 Why would we 
ever trust our liberty to a Congress (or a state legislature) that is at 
its best political and at its worst dysfunctional? Liberty is always en­
dangered, but judicial activism gives it at least a fighting chance. 
18 For elaboration, see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: 
PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2009). 
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